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INTRODUCTION: THE VULNERABILITY CHALLENGE
Lucia Re1
Abstract: The essay presents a discussion of 
vulnerability theory from a philosophical and a 
sociological perspective. The success of this 
new paradigm in the social sciences and even 
in the public discourse appears justified by the 
need to rethink the institutions and social ties 
of late modernity, also from a gender 
perspective. It is undoubtedly a fascinating 
prospect, but one that conceals numerous 
pitfalls. In particular, ideas of agency, conflict, 
emancipation and solidarity, which are closely 
connected with fundamental rights theory and 
the development of constitutionalism may lose 
importance. The vulnerability paradigm, rather 
than eclipsing the language of rights, could 
then be used to interpret these rights, to define 
them with increasing accuracy and reinforce 
their effectiveness. In particular, the bottom-up 
construction of an emancipatory notion of 
vulnerability may well lead to an auspicious 
update of the interpretation of the principles of 
dignity, equality and solidarity, principles that 
nevertheless still appear today as 
indispensable. 
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The relationship between strength, 
power and law is one of the major problems of 
Western political and juridical philosophy. In 
particular, much of modern political and 
juridical debate deals with the role of 
institutions in ensuring security. In his 
Rassurer et protéger. Le sentiment de sécurité 
dans l’Occident d’autrefois, Jean Delumeau 
(1989) states that in many European languages 
there came into being, between the fifteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, a neologism derived 
from the Latin securitas, which expressed the 
concept of security. In Italian the word 
sicurezza emerged during the Renaissance in 
place of the older sicurtà, while in Spanish the 
term seguridad replaced the previous 
segurança. In the same period, in English, in 
addition to safety there emerged the word 
security. Lastly, in French, during the 
seventeenth century, the term sécurité took its 
place beside sureté. This linguistic change was 
indicative of a cultural change. It signaled the 
emergence of a new way of thinking, which 
had to do with the role of the community in 
ensuring security. The need to conceive of 
security in new terms was linked to a new 
dimension of individual freedom. As Zygmunt 
Bauman (1999) has shown, turning on its head 
the analysis Freud made in Das Unbehagen in 
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der Kultur (1930), exercising individual 
freedom implies taking risks2. 
For Delumeau, the modern notion of 
security has theological roots: in the Christian 
view, the believer finds refuge in God, but at 
the same time he must remain troubled, since 
faith implies an ongoing spiritual quest3. This 
ambivalent feature of security is also reflected 
in the secular vision of Renaissance man. For 
Machiavelli, as for Shakespeare, man must 
tempt fate, in defiance of his need for security4, 
while the task of guaranteeing the protection of 
individuals and the community is left up to 
institutions. Securitas is the purpose of “good 
government” and is the basis – we think of 
Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy (1531) – of 
the birth of the city. The same paradigm is 
found in the social contract tradition, even in 
the Hobbesian vision. For Hobbes (1651), the 
sovereign State, which has a monopoly on 
legitimate force, strikes terror in its subjects in 
order to protect them from the anomic violence 
that characterizes the state of nature. Freedom 
would thus seem to be definitively sacrificed 
                                                          
2 For Freud, human beings are willing to give up a part 
of their freedom in exchange for security. Bauman 
argues that the increase in the post-modern era of 
individual freedom has led many to accept uncertainty, 
at the expense of a sense of security. However, I think 
we can say, as I will explain in more detail later, that in 
modern age the building of public security nets has gone 
hand in hand with the expansion of individual freedom. 
Freud’s and Bauman’s analyses are therefore not 
antithetical. As Tamar Pitch (2006) has emphasized, 
what has changed over time, rather than the propensity 
of individuals to take risks, is the willingness of public 
institutions to guarantee security (see also Re, 2010). 
on the altar of security. As we know, Hobbes 
nevertheless exploited the literary fiction of 
placing in a remote era the acquisitive 
passions, competition and violence typical of 
the modern political entity that struggles for 
self-assertion (see Bobbio, 1989)5. 
In Hobbes’s construction it is the 
Leviathan that, from above, imposes rational 
behavior on its subjects, turning them into 
political and legal subjects capable of acting 
within the social contract. For other 
contractarian authors – from Grotius to Locke 
and Rousseau – it is individuals themselves 
who, by exercising rationality as a function of 
self-preservation, manage to control their 
violent impulses and accept the power of the 
State (see Santoro, 1999: 202-203). In this 
vision, on which, as we know, modern liberal 
thought is founded, the political and legal 
subject, represented by a “hierarchical-
dualistic” model (Ibid.) as an “I” that can 
control its passions through the use of reason 
(see Pulcini, 2001), it makes a regulated use of 
freedom and appears able to manage risk by an 
3 This dual dimension of the Christian faith is put 
forward explicitly in Pascal’s works. 
4 Delumeau cites apropos of this Act 3 of Macbeth, 
where Shakespeare has Hecate say that “security is 
mortals’ chiefest enemy.” 
5 Here we can only refer briefly to the classics of modern 
political thought, with the inevitable effect of greatly 
simplifying our interpretation. For a particularly 
interesting reading of Leviathan for the purposes of the 
argument developed in this book, see Cavarero, 2013, 
ch. 7 and Guaraldo, 2012, ch. 3. 
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alternation of bold and cautious behavior, 
within a social contract that has transferred to 
the State the task of ensuring security, in the 
first place thanks to “legal immunization” 
(Esposito, 2002). With due distinctions, it may, 
therefore, be said that the experience of 
individual vulnerability – in its etymological 
meaning as “exposure to injury” – founded the 
major modern philosophical visions of 
political order, but it remains in the 
background, in latency. Within the social 
contract, vulnerability could thus be associated 
with a condition of fragility, weakness and 
deficiency proper to dependent subjects 
incapable of self-government and therefore 
expelled from the public space. These are 
subjects who are seen as “weak” and 
“inferior,” namely – in different historical 
periods – women, children, the insane, the 
poor, prisoners, the colonized, slaves, 
homosexuals, the disabled, the elderly, etc. 
As Adriana Cavarero (2013) has 
shown, this philosophical tradition, moving 
from an individualistic ontology that draws an 
“I” guided by recta voluntas, is anchored to a 
precise geometry of verticality. It was 
countered, in the history of philosophy, by a 
                                                          
6 “in un intreccio continuo di dipendenze plurime e 
singolari”. 
7 While in Marian iconography the leaning of the mother 
toward her child was often shadowed by the 
monumentality of the sacred (cf. Cavarero, 2013: 137) 
or served to celebrate the dedication of mothers to their 
male children sons as the privileged recipients of their 
care, what remained even more in shadow in Western 
culture was the image of the mother-daughter 
relational ontology, which has its 
corresponding geometry in the inclination of a 
subject obliquely “bending over the other,” 
according to the archetypal image of the 
Madonna and child handed down by the 
Marian tradition: a “maternal subject” who 
bends over the other, especially over the 
helpless, aware of being immersed “in a 
continuous web of plural and singular 
dependencies” 6(ibid: 24). This subject, 
conscious of its own and others’ vulnerability, 
has often been identified with femininity and 
was relegated to the margins of philosophical, 
juridical and political discourse7. During the 
twentieth century, the feminist movement 
brought this subject to light through its intense 
job of excavating the genealogies and 
experiences of women (see Diotima, 1987), at 
intervals allying and clashing with 
psychoanalysis as the recognized “discoverer” 
of the unconscious and the complexity of the 
emotions8. The reflection on vulnerability, 
which – as Alessandra Grompi shows in her 
essay published in this volume9 – has involved 
the entire history of philosophy, produced, in 
the second half of the twentieth century, 
especially fruitful results. 
relationship, constantly removed from patriarchal 
culture (see Luce Irigaray, 1974). 
8 For an interesting analysis of the role of feminism and 
psychoanalysis in constructing the contemporary 
subject, see Tommasi, 2016. 
9 Grompi offers an interpretation of the Sophocles’ 
Philoctetes inspired by contemporary feminist literature, 
in which she places at the center of her analysis the idea 
of vulnerability. 
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Feminist thought, which has 
reinterpreted subjectivity in the light of 
psychoanalytic theories – attempting to correct 
its patriarchal stamp10 – has referred to the 
work of philosophers of Jewish origin, in 
particular Emmanuel Levinas, Simone Weil 
and Hannah Arendt11. The joining of these 
lines of interpretation is not accidental but due 
to a reflection on violence against the unarmed 
and defenseless, which, far from being the 
product of abstract theorizing, is dictated by 
the urgency of actual experience12. 
If, as Sandra Rossetti claims in her 
essay published here, it is possible to identify 
a “Jewish line” of thought on vulnerability, it 
is not only because this theme runs through the 
biblical and Talmudic tradition, but because 
the need to reflect on vulnerability became 
urgent in the mid-twentieth century by the 
dramatic events of the persecution of Jews in 
Europe and the Holocaust, as well as by the 
unprecedented carnage of the Second World 
war. It was therefore from that moment in 
history that ethical reflection gradually 
                                                          
10 See for example the works of Luce Irigaray, Nancy 
Chodorow and Judith Butler. 
11 For an analysis of vulnerability in the history of 
philosophy, see Tommasi, 2016. 
12 See on this topic Hannah Arendt, 1970, especially 
Chapter 1. 
13 On Lévinas’s thought in this regard see both the 
analyses of Judith Butler (2005; 2015) and the criticism 
of Adriana Cavarero (2013: 183-240). On Weil, see 
Tommasi, 1993 e 1997. 
14 As we know, the history of feminism is often 
represented as a succession of three "waves": the first by 
the so-called “feminism of equality,” which demanded 
concentrated on the issue of vulnerability, 
understood primarily as an ontological datum. 
Levinas, Weil and Arendt shifted the focus 
from the “egocentric” subject of the modern 
European philosophical tradition to a subject 
that is constructed in relation to the “other,” 
“exposed to the other” and, at the same time, 
“impinged upon” by the other.13 
Likewise, the experience of physical, 
psychological and epistemic violence has 
stimulated much of “the second wave” of 
feminist thought14: “Take your foot off our 
necks!” was for Catharine MacKinnon (1987) 
the cry that gave birth to consciousness-raising 
groups. Moving from the deconstruction of the 
subject of philosophy and modern law, in the 
name of the affirmation of “sexual difference,” 
feminist thought came to criticize the myth of 
autonomy and insisted on the importance of 
caring relationships (see Gilligan, 1982) and 
on the hidden constraints of dependency in the 
contractarian paradigm of democratic 
citizenship (see Pateman, 1988), emphasizing 
the subject’s interrelated nature (see Pulcini, 
for equal rights for women and men; the second the 
“feminism of difference” and the “radical feminism” of 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, both of which denounced the 
epistemic violence of patriarchy (while the “feminism of 
difference” supported the need to rediscover the value of 
“female difference,” “radical feminism” shed light on 
the existence of a male domain, based on a systematic 
oppression of women by men); and the third and current 
“post-feminist” and “neo-feminist” movements, very 
different from each other but united by their intention to 
deconstruct both male and female gender identity. For 
an introduction to feminist philosophies, see. Cavarero 
and Restaino, 2002. See also Loretoni, 2014. 
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2001; 2009). Some feminist authors, finally, 
have developed a conception of vulnerability 
as having a universal nature. 
In this regard, the theoretical path of 
Martha Albertson Fineman is emblematic 
among the major American women 
philosophers of contemporary law; prompted 
by the feminist criticism of the theory of 
modern law (Fineman and Sweet Thomadsen 
(eds.), 1991), she denounced the mythological 
character of the construction of the idea of 
autonomy in Anglo-American culture and law 
(Fineman, 2004), to arrive at a theory of 
universal vulnerability as a basis for a review 
of the principle of equality and institutional 
action (Fineman (ed.), 2013)15. We publish 
here Fineman’s essay “The Vulnerable Subject 
and the Responsive State,” which aims at 
identifying the responsiveness that State 
institutions should provide in order to care for 
the vulnerability of citizens, understood both 
as an ontological datum and as a socially 
constructed datum16. 
The reflection on vulnerability is 
certainly indebted to the essay of another 
American author, Eva Feder Kittay (see in 
particular 1999), who made the transition from 
an ethic of care in part celebrative of female 
                                                          
15 See the interview in which she outlines her intellectual 
development: Wegerstad and Selberg, 2011. 
16 I will return later to this distinction. 
17 For a critique of this stance, MacKinnon, 1987: 
Chapter 2. I’ve discussed MacKinnon’s criticism of 
Carol Gilligan in Re, 2015. 
self-abnegation17 to a political reflection on 
care work – mainly entrusted to women – as a 
foundation absent from decent social 
functioning. We publish here Kittay’s essay 
“Dependency,” in which she moves from an 
analysis of both “inevitable dependence,” 
which unites all, and the particular 
circumstances of dependency, such as those of 
people with disabilities, to propose that 
institutions consider the management of 
dependency as a priority goal, to be achieved 
instead of the traditional liberal goal of 
“individual independence.” In this volume 
Maria Giulia Bernardini also questions the 
relationship between vulnerability and law, 
with particular reference to disabled people. 
In the twenty-first century, reflection 
on vulnerability has received new momentum, 
thanks again to feminist thinkers such as Judith 
Butler and Adriana Cavarero, who, by 
undertaking one of the most interesting 
dialogues of contemporary philosophy, have 
also questioned the role of violence, especially 
starting with 9/11 and the horizon of “global 
war” that this event ushered in18. This theme 
has also been developed by Elena Pulcini, both 
in La cura del mondo (2009) and in her essay 
published in this volume. Pulcini, in direct 
18 See especially Butler, 2004 and 2009, and Cavarero, 
2007. For a comparison of these two philosophers, see 
Bernini and Guaraldo (eds.), 2009. 
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dialogue with Butler and Cavarero, broadens 
the reflection on vulnerability, addressing the 
themes of “difference” and “contamination” in 
our contemporary “risk society.” 
Valeria Marzocco’s essay in this 
volume deals with the way in which the notion 
of vulnerability is used in late twentieth-
century reflections on risk developed in the 
social sciences. It is a critical reflection, which 
indicates how the concepts of vulnerability and 
resilience19 could be utilized in neoliberal 
governance strategies, associated with a post-
modern anthropological model, in which the 
subject’s area of freedom is strongly 
compressed. For if, as Brunella Casalini 
maintains in her essay published here, 
philosophical reflection on vulnerability opens 
up many avenues for reconfiguring social and 
institutional action, beginning with a 
reassessment of both the ethical and political 
importance of care work and care relationships 
(Tronto, 1993; 1995; 2013; Kittay, 1999; 
Fineman (ed.), 2013), it also presents some 
important weaknesses. It is, in short, a 
particularly fecund philosophical perspective, 
which nevertheless, as Orsetta Giolo also 
suggests in her Conclusions, needs to be 
examined in depth with care and caution when, 
from the sphere of philosophical analysis, we 
                                                          
19 “Resilience” is for the physical sciences the capacity 
of a body to absorb a blow without breaking. The 
concept was then used in psychology to denote the 
capacity to face and overcome a traumatic event or a 
move on to that of political and legal policy. 
This was the motivating principle of the 
international call for papers (see Inter-
Universities Working Group on the Political 
Subjectivity of Women, 2015) which made the 
publication of this volume possible, in its 
ambition to start examining the debate on 
vulnerability by inquiring into the possible 
meanings of the term, and subjecting them to 
critical examination, though without rejecting 
a priori the idea that, through the paradigm of 
vulnerability, it is possible to rethink, at least 
in part, politics, the law and institutional 
action. 
In the new century, the notion of 
vulnerability developed by philosophical 
theory has indeed been gradually transferred to 
other areas and, in particular, to political, 
juridical and social theory, but also to 
legislation and to international and European 
policies. It has contributed to the development 
of a public discourse in which the role and 
activities of institutions are configured in new 
terms with respect to the twentieth-century 
European model of the Welfare State, by many 
considered outdated, both because it is 
considered inadequate to meet the challenges 
of economic globalization and because it has 
been accused of being too rigid, unsuited to 
difficult period. In the social sciences it is used broadly 
to mean the capacity to cope successfully with a risk. For 
a discussion of the meanings of the term, see in this 
volume, besides Marzocco, Bagattini and Gutwald. 
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contemporary fragmented societies in which 
social classes are no longer clearly identifiable, 
and the link between citizenship, ownership of 
social rights and labor appears severed. 
As Chiara Saraceno has argued: “The 
welfare state was born and developed from 
social legislation that from the late nineteenth 
century on regulated labor relations in 
industry”20 (2013, Kindle edition). The 
Welfare State, however, must be understood in 
a broader sense as a State that “intervenes in 
economic reproduction and redistribution 
mechanisms to reallocate life opportunities 
among individuals and social classes”21 (Ibid.). 
Today there exist various models of welfare: 
some, as has occurred in the history of 
European social-democracies, have developed 
thanks to the struggles of trade unions and 
workers’ movements, while others have 
derived from the contributions of the various 
actors, “such as the agrarian classes or the 
middle classes, or the women’s movement, or 
employers’ organizations”22 (Ibid.). 
Welfare systems are not all alike. Even 
the most refurbished can do with being 
updated, in particular in order to better protect 
                                                          
20 “Il welfare state nasce e si sviluppa a partire dalla 
legislazione sociale che, dalla seconda metà 
dell’Ottocento in poi, ha regolato i rapporti di lavoro 
nell’industria”. 
21 “interviene nei meccanismi di riproduzione 
economica e di redistribuzione per riallocare le 
opportunità di vita tra gli individui e le classi sociali” 
22 “quali le classi agrarie o le classi medie, o il 
movimento delle donne, o le organizzazioni degli 
imprenditori”. 
23 “welfare di condivisione”. 
those – mostly women – who carry out or have 
carried out in the course of their lives unpaid 
care-giving tasks. This request, already present 
in much feminist sociological and economic 
literature (see, for example, the numerous 
works of Alisa del Re, Franca Bimbi, 
Antonella Picchio), is formulated today with 
radical urgency by movements that support the 
need to create a “sharing welfare,”23 which, 
starting with the common condition of job 
insecurity – and thus of “social vulnerability” 
– achieves the right to a “self-determination of 
income,” 24defined as a “guarantee of the right 
to existence,” the “possibility of freeing up 
time to build, outside of the logic of 
performance, knowledge, relationships, 
politics”25 (Femministe Nove, 2013). For these 
groups, vulnerability is above all a socially 
constructed given to which the State must 
provide an adequate response. However, there 
is an institutional vocabulary of vulnerability 
that only partially coincides with this. In the 
social sciences, but also in documents that 
address local, national and international 
policies, as well as in legal language26, the 
concept of vulnerability has broad appeal, 
24 “reddito di autodeterminazione”. 
25 come “garanzia del diritto all’esistenza”, “possibilità 
per liberare tempo, per costruire, fuori dalla logica della 
prestazione, saperi, relazioni, politica”. 
26 One of the first attempts to formalize the idea of 
vulnerability in international documents – by comparing 
it to the principles of autonomy, dignity and integrity – 
was made with the formulation of a Proposal of 
Declaration on Bioethics at the European level, adopted 
in Barcelona in 1998 and presented to the European 
Commission. On the role of the idea of vulnerability in 
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though the meanings this concept takes on vary 
greatly from one instance to the next. 
It is used with reference to prevention, 
support and protection, aimed at individuals, 
specific social groups, and sometimes even 
territories, artworks, landscape heritages and 
the environment, etc. Thus the concept of 
vulnerability is used to frame a wide range of 
social issues and – as Estelle Ferrarese also 
notes in her essay – we refer to it alternately as 
a universal condition and as a characteristic of 
specific categories of subjects27. It often refers 
to children and, in particular, children living in 
poverty, who – as Alexander Bagattini and 
Rebecca Gutwald show in this volume –can be 
considered as a category exposed to specific 
forms of vulnerability. At times universal 
vulnerability and particular vulnerabilities 
appear to clash28, while at other times they 
seem to be associated29. On the subject of the 
social sciences and in some policies, 
ontological vulnerability – whether presented 
as universal or ascribed to certain categories of 
                                                          
the law, see in this volume Maria Giulia Bernardini’s 
essay, which lays particular emphasis on the interruption 
in the language of fundamental rights with the adoption 
in 2006 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (UNCRPD), a Convention that became 
operative in 2008. 
27 The topic of socially constructed vulnerability, 
“special vulnerabilities” and the relationship between 
vulnerability and poverty is examined in this volume by 
Estelle Ferrarese, with particular reference to Robert 
Castel’s  (1991) and Serge Paugam’s (1991) 
considerations. See also Ferrarese’s essay 
“Vulnerability: A Concept with Which to Undo the 
World as It Is?”, 2016. 
28 I refer in particular to the instance in which policies 
and regulations identify specific categories of “weak” 
human beings – often appears confused with 
vulnerability produced by social institutions 
themselves30. 
“Vulnerability” appears, therefore, like 
other concepts that have had great success in 
the social sciences and then have become part 
of public discussion and common parlance31 a 
catchword, the use of which may in some cases 
be misleading, but it reveals the need to 
designate something new, to promote an 
unprecedented point of view. Far from being 
the result of a current fashion, the success of 
this notion appears justified by the need to 
rethink the institutions and social ties of late 
modernity (Beck, 1986), also from a gender 
perspective (see Del Re, 2013), as Elena 
Pulcini has clearly indicated in La cura del 
mondo (2009). 
The results which this rethinking can 
lead, however, are uncertain. The vulnerability 
paradigm is, as mentioned, ambivalent. 
Moreover, it seems to presuppose a democratic 
and pluralistic society in which it is possible to 
beneficiaries of protection, due to a deficit presented as 
a constituent of the subjects themselves (female 
weakness, difficulty in integrating foreigners, disability, 
etc.), helping to crystallize inferiorizing stereotypes and 
presupposing that society is homogenous and composed, 
with certain exceptions, of autonomous individuals 
conceived as “invulnerable.” As for the disabled, this 
viewpoint has been regarded as typical of the so-called 
“ability model” denounced by the authors linked to 
Disability Studies (see Bernardini, 2016). 
29 It is true of the Proposed Barcelona Declaration of 
1998 (see above, note 26). 
30 Brunella Casalini examines the topic in depth in this 
volume. 
31 I am thinking especially of the word “globalization.” 
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overcome conflicts and rebuild new forms of 
community. According to this view, with the 
demise of the patriarchal paradigm of 
modernity32, the State takes responsibility for 
the “care” horizon (Del Re, 2013; Lister, 
2003). Public institutions – in which an ever 
greater role is being played by women workers 
and, to a lesser extent, by women designated to 
hold positions of responsibility – are being 
“feminized” (see for instance the World 
Economic Forum, 2015), demonstrating – this 
is at least the hope – that they are more 
attentive to social inclusion which is no longer 
based on integration through work, but on the 
need to receive and give “care.”33 According to 
this view, the language of rights tends to lose 
importance. The proposed perspective seems 
focused on reassessing the community 
dimension34, the importance of social and 
emotional ties, mutual obligations, 
responsibility, rather than the individualistic 
paradigm that the rule of law model 
presupposes (Zolo, 2002). 
                                                          
32 For a discussion on the concepts of “patriarchy,” “neo-
patriarchy,” and “post-patriarchy,” see for example 
Morondo Taramundi, 2015; Persano, 2014 and Giolo, 
2015. Many of the philosophical and sociological 
analyses on vulnerability do not explicitly espouse the 
thesis of the “death of patriarchy” sustained, at least in 
Italy, by some influential feminists (see Libreria delle 
donne, 1996). Some of these analyses – such as those of 
Judith Butler, Adriana Cavarero and Martha A. Fineman 
– are even linked to a denunciation of the so-called 
heteronormative patriarchal system, i.e. a system based 
on male dominance over women and on heterosexuality 
as the founding norm of the social order. And yet, it 
The recognition of civil, political and 
social rights – as Norberto Bobbio taught 
(1990) – was the result of conflicts – even 
bloody ones – which from time to time have 
featured certain social classes35. From the 
second half of the twentieth century some 
headway has been made by the so-called third 
generation rights (Ferrajoli, 1994), whose 
consecration in constitutional and legislative 
texts – where it has taken place – is due mainly 
to the arduous struggles for recognition of 
minorities and marginalized groups (women, 
homosexuals, African Americans, religious 
minorities, etc.). The assumption of 
vulnerability as a new public spotlight of 
action seems to move from the idea that this 
historical phase is over and that – at least in the 
Western democracies – it is possible to rethink 
politics and institutions on the basis of a new 
inclusive universalism. This perspective parts 
from the observation that the “politics of 
identity” (Young, 1990), which has led to the 
recognition of many minority rights, today 
risks turning in on itself, by placing in constant 
seems to me that all these analyses are animated by a 
confidence in the possibility of redesigning institutional 
action by overcoming the patriarchal contractarian 
model of the Modern State. 
33 What I maintain here is not that care is a feminine 
prerogative but that considerations about care derive 
from feminist movements and theories that have also 
stressed the need to bring it to the center of public debate 
and institutional action. 
34 Although understood as deeply different from the 
“immune community” that is the focus of many 
communitarian visions (see Pulcini, 2009). 
35 On this point see also Ferrajoli, 2002. 
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competition with each other the different social 
groups bearing requests for recognition36. It is 
destined to maintain a state of permanent 
conflict, a clash between irreconcilable visions 
of the world. 
According to the vulnerability 
paradigm, it is therefore necessary to 
rediscover what unites us as human beings in 
order to re-establish a more just and peaceful 
society. It is undoubtedly a fascinating 
prospect, but one that conceals numerous 
pitfalls. In particular, in the context of the neo-
liberal system in which we are immersed, it can 
lead to masking altogether different 
governmental37 objectives and to support 
disguised forms of “tyranny of the majority”38 
and political and cultural imperialism. If 
institutions and the community take charge of 
the vulnerability of individuals or certain 
groups, their intervention can take on a 
paternalistic and even illiberal character. Ideas 
of agency39, conflict and emancipation, which 
were the basis of modern politics, may lose 
importance. Then there is the risk that, through 
the universalist interpretation of the notion of 
vulnerability, the most subversive part of 
feminist thought may end up being removed: 
                                                          
36 This idea is also expressed clearly by Martha 
Fineman. 
37 The reference is to the concept of “governmentality” 
as developed by Michel Foucault (see Foucault, 2004). 
Foucault indicated by this term “the rationality of 
administrative power that characterizes modern liberal 
societies” (Andreani and Bernini, 2009: 142) 
one that emphasized the persistence of male 
dominance and the need to overthrow it40, but 
also one that, by criticizing so-called “White 
feminism,” has highlighted “from margin” 
reflection (bell hooks, 1984; Anzaldúa, 1987) 
and the importance of always bearing in mind 
the fracture brought about by colonialism 
(Spivak, 1999). 
Lastly, the objective of strengthening 
the resilience to respond to individual 
vulnerability and that of certain groups – a goal 
which, as Bagattini and Gutwald emphasize in 
this volume, can be decisive for protecting 
certain social groups – can at the same time 
lead, within the individualist neo-liberal 
anthropological model, to supplanting the 
more radical forms of resistance to oppression 
and to hinder the construction of collective 
subjects who are bearers of a “grassroots social 
solidarity.” This idea lies at the basis of 
significant experiences of twentieth-century 
constitutionalism – starting with the Italian one 
of 1948 – and has been translated into 
fundamental rights consecrated not only at the 
national but also at the international level (see 
Rodotà, 2016). The vulnerability paradigm, 
rather than eclipsing the language of rights, 
38 The expression, as is known, comes from Tocqueville 
(1840). 
39 “The term agency […] refers to a complex polysemy, 
implying, at the same time, the concepts of action, self- 
positioning of the subject agent, and assumption of 
responsibility (also in an ethical-political sense) toward 
the action itself” (Andreani and Bernini, 2009: 135). 
40 See the works of Catharine A. MacKinnon. 
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could then be used to interpret these rights, to 
define them with increasing accuracy and 
reinforce their effectiveness. Vulnerability and 
solidarity should then be considered as an 
indissoluble pair, as essential references for 
European as well as international 
constitutionalism (see Mazzarese, 2016). The 
bottom-up construction of an emancipatory 
notion of vulnerability (Zanetti, 2016) may 
well lead to an auspicious update of the 
interpretation of the principles of dignity, 
equality and solidarity – an update already in 
progress in the activity of national and 
international courts – principles that 
nevertheless still appear today as 
indispensable41. 
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